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PFIZER'S EPIDEMIC: A NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
David M Carrt
"[O]ne cannot consider rights without also considering
duties. Whenever a human right is stated, it implies an
obligation on someone else to do something for the
possessor of the right... and when I recognize the rights of
other people, I incur a duty to act so that the rights are in
fact realized. Rights and duties are the positive and
negative sides of the same process.'
'
Introduction
In 1996, an outbreak of spinal meningitis struck West Africa,
reportedly claiming more than fifteen thousand lives.2  Pfizer, Inc.-a
major international pharmaceutical company-rushed to the nation's aid,
bringing needed supplies and medical staff, but Pfizer had something extra
in its pocket for Nigeria: Trovan, an experimental drug for the treatment of
meningitis.
3
Doctors treated close to one hundred children with Trovan and, six
weeks later, left Nigeria with their research findings.4 Shortly after Pfizer's
departure, locals began reporting severe health problems, even death,
t J.D., Case Western Reserve University (2003). 1 would like to thank Professor Hiram
Chodosh for his support. I would also like to thank the Executive Board of the Case
Western Reserve University Journal of International Law for their endless hours of pushing,
shoving, threatening, and help. Finally, I would like to thank my beloved wife for her
patience during the many lost nights of companionship while I wrote this Note.
M. Weatherall, Research Sponsored by Industry, in MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION AND
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE XIITH CIOMS ROUND TABLE
CONFERENCE 52 (Dr. Normal Howard Jones & Dr. Zbigniew Bankowski eds., 1978).
2 David Warsh, Where the Germs Are, Boston Globe, Jan. 2, 2001, at Cl; Families:
Pfizer Hurt, Killed Kids, Sept. 3, 2001, at http://www.swisstox.net/en/news-e.php?st.langkey
=en&st news id=735.
3 Joe Stephens, The Body Hunters: Exporting Human Experiments: Where Profits and
Lives Hang in the Balance: Finding an Abundance of Subjects and Lack of Oversight
Abroad, Big Drug Companies Test Offshore to Speed Products to Market, WASH. POST, Dec.
17, 2000, at A l.
4 Id. According to Pfizer, the oral form of Trovan had never before been tested on
children. Id.
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resulting from their involvement with Pfizer's research.5 Investigations by
news reporters showed indications of forgery of research documents, 6 lack
of oversight of research procedures,7 and a failure to administer effective
treatment to needy participants. 8 In August of 2001, the families of the
children who participated in the Kano research brought a lawsuit claiming
that Pfizer had violated international and national laws in carrying out
experimental research on humans.9 Pfizer's case is the first instance in U.S.
history of foreign individuals bringing a lawsuit against a private
corporation for wrongful experimentation in violation of U.S. and
international law. 10 The facts of the Pfizer case illustrate the declining
effectiveness and trust in national courts, and the growing need for
international intervention.11
In December 1998, the Director-General of the World Health
Organization ("WHO"), Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, stood before an
international body commemorating the celebration of the fiftieth
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and called for an
5 Id. The alleged health problems include blindness, deafness, and other meningitis-
related problems resulting from a lack of treatment. Id.
6 See Sarah Boseley, New Drug 'Illegally Tested on Children': Pfizer Accused of
Irregularities During Clinical Trial in Nigeria, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Jan. 17, 2001, at
19 (noting that a letter authorizing the research may have been written months after the
research team had left Nigeria). Parents of the children participating also complained that
they did not know the research to be experimental. See Sam Eferaro, Trovan: Sifting the
Facts From Fiction, AFRICA NEWS, Jan. 21, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Africa
News File.
7 Doctors in the area contradict Pfizer's claims of prior approval by alleging that no
approval committees were existent at the time Pfizer conducted the research, and also that
some doctors had aided in forging permission forms. See Boseley, supra note 6.
8 Some patients were shown to have progressively declined in health while taking Trovan
and were not taken off Trovan when their lives were threatened. See Eferaro, supra note 6.
9 Pfizer Prays U.S. Court to Dismiss Case, AFRICA NEWS, Nov. 29, 2001, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Africa News File.
10 Patti Waldmeir, The Guinea Pigs Demand Justice: Those Who Claim to Have Suffered
in Medical Trials are Seeking Redress the American Way--Through the Courts, FIN. TIMES
(LoNDON), Oct. 18, 2001, at 19.
11 Pfizer's case is not the only example of multinational corporations accused of abusing
developing countries as targets for experimental research. "[W]hat Pfizer did in Kano was
typical of how multinationals go to developing countries and take advantage of lack of rules
or their enforcement to do what they wanted. 'It fits the pattern of multinational
corporations in the third world."' 'Why We Sued Pfizer in US', AFRICA NEWS, Dec. 5, 2001,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Africa News File (quoting Ali Ahmad, the attorney
bringing the Phizer case to the United States). For other examples of corporations involved
in ethical problems with experimental research in developing countries see Stephens, supra
note 3.
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international recognition of human health 2 as a basic human right.'3 Dr.
Brundtland acknowledged the need for recognizing, protecting, and
enforcing health as a basic human right. 14 The basic human right to health
poses a dangerous dichotomy. On one hand, the right supports the notion
of researching and developing new medical treatments to preserve and/or
aid health; on the other hand, the right to health and the drive to discover
new medical technology creates a need for human experimentation,
including the need to protect patients and doctors involved in experimental
research. 5 An international standard is needed to provide a minimum bar
of ethical considerations and legal guidelines to protect the rights of
individuals subject to experimental research.
In 1947, the judges at the Nuremberg criminal trials introduced an
international standard of human rights for patients involved in human
experimentation.16  The world has changed a great deal since the
Nuremberg trials. National borders have thinned and technology and
medical science are screaming forward at a pace unparalleled in the history
of the world.
In response to the increase in science and technology, the laws of
developed nations have evolved in order to control growth and prevent a
recurrence of events similar to the Nazi medical experiments. However, the
increase in national regulation also brings an increase in the cost of research
and a need to preserve the rights of patients and physicians involved in
12 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
G.A. Res. 217A (I1), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
13 Press Release, WHO, Director-General Sets Out',WHO Stance on Health and Human
Rights (Dec. 8, 1998), at http://www.who.int/inf-pr-1998/en/pr98-93.html (Dr. Brundtland
stated, "The Principle of Health for All, and of equal access to health services for all, is ...
central to humankind's development, and the securing of basic human rights . .
14 id.
15 Harold H. Phillips, Externally Sponsored Research, in MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION AND
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE XXIITH CIOMS ROUND TABLE
CONFERENCE 56, 56-57 (Dr. Norman Howard-Jones & Dr. Zbigniew Bankowski eds., 1978)
(recognizing the need for "adequate control" and that situations may arise that indicate
specific needs for control). Pfizer's case is a good example of new circumstances arising
indicating the necessity of control.
16 Judges Harold Sebring, Walter Beals, & Johnson Crawford, The Nuremberg Doctors'
Trial: The Judgment, in HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A READER 292-300 (Jonathan M.
Mann et al. eds., 1999).
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experimental research.' 7 Because of the strict regulations in the developed
countries, as well as increasing costs of research, private companies have
turned their medical experimentation to less developed countries, where
legal and governmental systems have yet to develop similar controls and
where the cost of research is significantly lower.' 8 Lower health standards
in developing countries enable diseases to run rampant, providing
opportunities for private companies to test experimental medical procedures
on human subjects. 19  Experimental research is a benefit to both the
developing country and the private company because it can help struggling
countries control disease as well as provide much-needed information to
company physicians conducting experiments.2°
Human experimentation has the potential to cause great harm to
populations in developing countries. 21  Due to the differences between
national laws, there is a real danger of abuse in human experimentation.
Many developed countries have regulations that prescribe procedures for
physicians to follow, but these regulations often apply only to those
receiving federal aid in research. Further, because there are no
international treaties governing experimentation on humans, international
law is devoid of regulations on human experimentation. 23 "As a result, the
international documents dealing with research trials have little legal
effect. ' '24  It is therefore critically important to provide guidance to
companies conducting research abroad in order to maximize the benefits
17 Jennifer Washburn, Undue Influence: How the Drug Industry's Power Goes Unchecked
and Why the Problem is Likely to Get Worse, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Aug. 13, 2001, at
16, 20, 22 (stating that it costs pharmaceutical companies millions every day FDA approval
is delayed and suggesting that more federal regulation of commercial research will better
protect patients). See also Ileana Domingues-Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of
Pharmaceutical Research and Human Rights: The Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 245, 245 (1997) (regulations increase costs but also protect patients).
18 Domingues-Urban, supra note 17, at 270-71.
19 This is also true with publicly funded research, but publicly funded research is guided
by United States regulation. The focus of this paper will be on private companies doing
research abroad and will not approach publicly funded research.
20 Clinical research on new drugs or vaccines can be beneficial to research participants
and the communities involved. Research participants receive "cost-free vaccines or drugs
that may prove beneficial in the prevention or treatment of ... disease," and "have access to
general medical care that would be practically impossible to receive" otherwise. E. Maxine
Ankrah & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Ethical and legal Considerations of the HIV epidemic in
Africa, in AIDS IN AFRICA 547, 555 (Max Essex et al. eds., 1994).
21 "Research in [developing countries] is therefore critically important." Id.
22 See Domingues-Urban, supra note 17, at 272 (noting that "a great deal of research is
federally regulated because of its federal funding.").
231d. at 273.
24 id.
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provided to developing countries, protect the corporations' interest in
continuing research, and minimize the potential for abuse.26
Section One of this paper will provide legal background behind current
international standards concerning human experimentation. Section Two
of this paper will discuss the details behind the events that took place in
Nigeria between Pfizer and the Nigerian families involved in the lawsuit.
Section Three will provide an analysis of voluntary consent and
enforcement under current international standards, as they stand compared
with the facts of Pfizer. Section Four will provide possible solutions to
problems discussed in Section Three. Section Five will conclude that
regulation of human experimentation in the international setting is needed
to protect individuals, researchers, and developing countries.
. Legal Background of Existing International Standards
Currently, three central standards provide guidelines by which doctors
measure their conduct for experimental research in international settings:
the Nuremberg Code (the "Code"), the Declaration of Helsinki (the
"Declaration") and the WHO-CIOMS Guidelines (the "Guidelines"). Each
of these standards was developed by different international entities, with
individual purposes, goals, and focal points.
A. The Nuremberg Code
In December of 1946, the criminal trials began for abuses of human
experimentation by Nazi doctors on imprisoned Jews, Gypsies, and other
minorities.27 These proceedings were the first attempt at criminalizing
abuse by medical experimentation on human beings in an international
25 See Thomas Donaldson, Adding Corporate Ethics to the Bottom Line, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Nov. 13, 2000, at 2.
26 With more than eighty percent of all experimental clinical trials in the world today
conducted by private pharmaceutical companies, it is more important than ever to set forth
clear, binding guidelines in order to protect not only private companies that conduct
experimental procedures across borders, but also individuals in developing countries, and
national interests abroad. Washburn, supra note 17, at 20. International guidelines would
help companies like Pfizer, a large U.S.-based pharmaceutical corporation, that have been
accused of human rights violations relating to experimental research. The urgency to enact
and enforce international Sebring, Beals & Crawford standards that will provide guidance to
doctors and companies conducting research in developing countries to safeguard national
diplomatic channels, protect companies, and preserve the integrity of current international
human rights is paramount. See Sebring, Beals & Crawford, supra note 16, at 297-98.
29 Tedford Taylor, Opening Statement of the Prosecution, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 67 (George J, Annas &
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
2003]
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setting, 28 and were among the first to create standards by which the
international practice of medicine might be controlled, thereby deterring
future abuse of medical experimentation on human beings.29
The tribunal judges provided a list of requirements for doctors
conducting experimental research which is now known as the Nuremberg
Code. 30  The list was meant to prescribe physician conduct to certain
minimums of ethical behavior as are required by universal moral, ethical
and legal concepts; the violation of which would bring down the
condemnation of society.31
The tests conducted by the Nazi doctors were of an unusually cruel
nature and performed without the consent of the individual or group.
32
Some of the experiments at Nuremberg had quasi-legitimate ends in
furthering medical knowledge to aid the military in caring for soldiers, but
these ends were gained at the expense of the patient.33  Most of the
experiments, however, had no legitimate end and were aimed only at more
effective control over certain populations or the eradication of a specific
ethnicity.34
The Nuremberg criminal trials carried the dual purpose of holding
specific individuals accountable for their barbarous acts against humanity
and recording the committed acts into history. 3 This second purpose was
perhaps the most striking and progressive move in the history of medicine
and law. It sought to establish international norms whereby others might be
held accountable for similar activity and sought to establish clear guidelines
28 Sharon Perley, et al., The Nuremberg Code: An International Overview, in THE NAZI
DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 149,
150 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
29 See Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 8-9
(1993); see also Thomas John Babbo, Begging the Question: Fetal Tissue Research, the
Protection of Human Subjects, and the Banality of Evil, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 383,
399-400 (2000) (recognizing the Nuremberg Code as the first guideline for human subjects
research).
30 Sebring, Beals & Crawford, supra note 16, at 298-99.
"' Id. at 297-98.
32 Without any of the patients' interests in mind, the Nazi doctors singled out individuals
based on ethnicity and race. These doctors subjected patients to high altitude tests, freezing
experiments, malaria experiments, poison gas tests, seawater tests, and limb and organ
transplantation testing. Most of the tests resulted in the death of the subject. Id. at 293-96.
" See id.
34 Id.
35 Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg Doctor's Trial: Opening Statement of the Prosecution,
in HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A READER 284, 284-85 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds.,
1999).
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to prescribe acceptable conduct for future human subjects medical
experiments.36
Because the Nuremberg Code was the first to attempt to create a
standard for ethical behavior in international human experimentation, the
Code has played a large part in influencing national regulation of human
experimentation in most Western countries.37 The Nuremberg Code has
had a direct influence in the creation of several biomedical ethics
organizations.38 Respect for the principles contained in the Code has
carried over into the language and principles of many other international
guidelines.39
The Nuremberg Code requires the voluntary consent of all participants
in experimental research.4 ° Voluntary consent is defined as the ability to
exercise free power of choice, the legal capacity to give consent, 41 and
"sufficient knowledge and comprehension.., as to enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened decision. ' 42 The Code places the burden of
ensuring the quality of the consent on the person initiating the research.43
The Code defines the ability to exercise "free power of choice" as the
right to remain free from "force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or
other ulterior form of constraint or coercion. ' 44 The Code requires that all
36 Michael Grodin, Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND
THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 121 (George J, Annas
& Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). Sebring, Beals & Crawford, supra note 16, at 298-99.
37 Many of the cases giving the start to modem U.S. legislation protecting human subjects
in experimental research refer directly to the Nuremberg Code. See, e.g., In re Weberlist,
360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 787 (1974); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 817
(2001); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237, n. 2 (1990); United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669, 687 (1987); Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 716
(1981).
38 See Dawn Joyce Miller, Research and Accountability: The Need for Uniform
Regulation of International Pharmaceutical Drug Testing, 13 PACE INT'L L. REv. 197, 203
(2001). The WMA and the WHO are two examples of such entities.
39 See World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects, 284 JAMA 3043 (2000) [hereinafter Declaration of
Helsinki]; International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human
Subjects, WHO-Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS)
(Geneva 2002) [hereinafter WHO-CIOMS Guidelines].
4o 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control
Council Law No. 10, 181, 181-82 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1949), reprinted in JUDITH
AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 996-98, art. 1 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter
Nuremberg Code].
41 Legal capacity to give consent is not explained further in the Code.
42 Nuremberg Code, supra note 40, at art. 1.
43 Id.
44id.
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participants in experimental research be aware of their ability to terminate
research participation at any point.45 The patient may withdraw from
research "if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation
of the experiment seems to him to be impossible. '' 6
The Code requires that all participants have sufficient knowledge and
comprehension of the research subject matter to make an informed
decision. 47 This requirement carries with it the responsibility to explain the
nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment, the method and means by
which the experiment is to be conducted, and an estimation of risks and
benefits to the participant.48
Other than placing the burden of evaluating the quality of consent
given on the person initiating the experimental research, the Code does not
provide specific measures of enforcement to assure physician adherence to
its standards.49
B. The Declaration of Helsinki
In September of 1947, inspired by the Nuremberg criminal trials, a
large group of private physicians gathered to establish an international
association, the World Medical Association ("WMA"), to focus on global
issues confronting physicians.50 The WMA was created to ensure the
"independence of physicians, and to work for the highest possible standards
of ethical behavior and care by physicians. ,,51 Since its inception, the
WMA has actively participated in the international community to protect
the interests of physicians and to promote its own ideals in shaping public
health policy through information gathering and dissemination in the
international health arena.52
The Declaration of Helsinki (the "Declaration"), created by the WMA
in 1964, set forth a list of duties and responsibilities that are expected of all
physicians taking part in experimental research on humans.53  The
Declaration secondarily addressed a minimum standard of rights and
45 Id. at art. 9. The physician is required to terminate the research if probable cause arises
that the research will likely end in injury, disability, or death to the participant. Id. at art. 10.
46 Id. at art. 9 (emphasis added).
47 Id. at art. 1.
48 id.
49 id.
50 See WORLD MEDICAL AsSOCIATION, INC., WMA Policy, at
http://www.wma.net/e/about.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2002).
51 id.
5 See id.
53 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3043, para. 1-13.
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special treatments reserved for patients or groups involved in experimental
research.54
The Declaration requires that all subjects of experimental research be
volunteers and informed participants. 55 The researcher must first inform
each subject of the "aims, methods, sources of funding, any possible
conflicts of interest, institutional affiliations of the researcher, the
anticipated benefits and potential risks of the study and the discomfort it
may entail. ' '56 After informing the participant, the researcher should then
obtain the subject's freely given consent, preferably in writing.57 If not in
writing, the consent must be formally documented and witnessed. 58
The Declaration mandates that physicians give "special attention" to
those patients that may give consent under duress.5 The Declaration
requires that patients participating in therapeutic research receive additional
protection from doctors.6 ° Participants in therapeutic research are assured
additional care by the "best-proven ... therapeutic measures" at the end of
the research.61 Participants may abstain from any part of the experimental
research.62 The refusal of a patient to participate in therapeutic research
should not interfere with the doctor-patient relationship.63 When obtaining
consent from a participant in a dependent relationship with a physician,
researchers should be "particularly cautious" to assure that the participant
does not consent under duress.64
Physicians should not conduct research on legally incompetent
individuals unless the research is necessary to promote the health of the
population represented65 and if research can otherwise be performed on
legally competent individuals.66 The Declaration recognizes the need for
special attention for "vulnerable" individuals participating in research,67
defining "vulnerable" as those who cannot give consent for themselves,
54 See id. at 3044-45, para. 14-29.
55 Id. at 3044, para. 20.
56 Id. at para. 22.
57Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 3043, para. 8.
6 0 Id. at 3044, para 28.
61 Id. at 3045, para. 30.
62 Id. at 3044, para. 22.
63 Id. at 3045, para. 31.
64 Id. at 3044, para. 23.
65 Id. at para. 24.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 3043, para. 8. The Declaration also acknowledges the need for physician
recognition of the economically and medically disadvantaged. Id.
2003]
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such as a minor child.68 Informed consent may be obtained from the legal
guardian of individuals that are legally incompetent and are unable to
provide consent for themselves. 69 Where proxy consent cannot be obtained
from individuals because of their incompetence, research should only be
done if the condition causing legal incompetence is a necessary
characteristic of the research population.7 °
The Declaration establishes that physicians should submit proposals of
experimental research to an independent ethical oversight committee. The
ethical oversight committee is to a ply the standards of the country wherein
the research is being conducted, but should not allow standards to fall
below those prescribed in the Declaration.72 The independent ethical
oversight committee is allowed continuous oversight for the duration of the
research.73 The Declaration provides that information obtained through a
breach of standards provided in the Declaration should not be published.
7 4
C. The WHO-CIOMS Guidelines
The World Health Organization ("WHO") is the health and human
rights arm of the United Nations. The United Nations, in 1947, created the
WHO in an effort to ensure "health to all people," and to protect the ability
of each individual on the earth to obtain health-related services. 75 The
United Nations empowered the WHO with the ability to report on the status
of health in all the world 76 and to ensure that governments live up to their
responsibility to provide "adequate health and social measures" to their
68 See id. at 3043, 3044, para. 8, 25. In some countries, classes of persons are not legally
given the right to consent for themselves: such as women, children, those suffering from
mental conditions, and other potentially vulnerable groups. See Ruth Macklin, University of
the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 240, 251 (George J, Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
69 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3044, para. 24, 25.
70 Id. at para. 26.
71 Id. at 3043, para. 13.
72 Id. at para. 9.
73 Id. at para. 13 (placing burden on the researcher to produce "monitoring information" to
the oversight committee, including adverse results). The physician also carries the burden of
reporting sources of funding, conflicts of interest, sponsors, institutional affiliations, and any
other potential conflicts of interest to the ethical oversight committee. Id.
74 Id. at 3044, para. 27.
75 Constitution of the World Health Organization, opened for signature July 22, 1946,
pmbl., 62 Stat. 2679, 2680, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
76 1d. at art. 2, 62 Stat. at 2681-82, 14 U.N.T.S. at 187-89.
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populations.77  The WHO can propose regulations and make
recommendations, with respect to international health matters, to the United
Nations.78 The WHO also cooperates with other agencies and associations
to accomplish its goals.79
The World Health Assembly ("WHA"), an elected body comprised of
technically qualified persons representing each member nation, °U directs
decision-making in the WHO. The WHA has the power to adopt
regulations that govern all member nations of the WHO as stated in the
WHO Constitution.81  The WHO's interests lie in appealing to the
professional field of medical sciences, in satisfying the legal demands of the
United Nations, and in protecting and informing the general public of health
related issues.
The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences
("CIOMS") is an international, non-governmental organization established
by the WHO and UNESCO82 in 1949.83 The main objectives of CIOMS are
to promote international biomedical activities, serve the scientific interests
of the international biomedical community, and maintain relations with the
WHO and the United Nations.84 While CIOMS does not have the power to
make binding regulations, it does report to the WHO and can influence
decisions made by the WHO.85 CIOMS has released a set of guidelines for
physicians and others conducting experimental research in the international
setting.86
The WHO-CIOMS Guidelines (the "Guidelines") require that each
individual give informed consent before participating in experimental
research.87 Informed consent requires that the physician inform the
potential patient of the nature,88 the aims, methods, risks and benefits,
77 Id. at pmbl., 62 Stat. at 2680, 14 U.N.T.S. at 186-87; see also id. at art. 2, 62 Stat. at
2681-82, 14 U.N.T.S. at 187-89.
78 Id. at art. 2(k), 62 Stat. at 2681, 14 U.N.T.S. at 188.
7 9 1d. at art. 2, 62 Stat. at 2681-82, 14 U.N.T.S. at 187-89.
80 d. at art. 11, 62 Stat. at 2683, 14 U.N.T.S. at 190; see also WHO Governance, at
http://www.who.int/m/topicgroups/governance/en/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2002).
8
'See Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 76, at art. 22, 62 Stat. at
2685, 14 U.N.T.S. at 193.
82 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
83 COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF MEDICAL SCIENCES, What is CIOMS?,
at http://www.cioms.ch/framewhat-is cioms.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2002).
84 Id.
85 See id.
86 Id.
87 WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 4.
88 See id. guideline 5. (stating "that the individual is invited to participate as a subject in
research..." (emphasis added)).
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alternative treatments available, 89 and of the patient's ability to refuse to
participate or withdraw from the research at any point without
repercussion.9" The Guidelines require prior approval of the scientific and
ethical aspects of the research by an ethical review committee. 9' The
Guidelines require constant vigilance but not supervision by an investigator
and/or ethical review committee.92 The Guidelines provide that the right to
compensation for accidental injury incurred in experimental research cannot
be waived93 and provide that any benefit derived from the research should
be returned, in part, to the community from which information was
gathered. 94 The Guidelines also allow sanctions to be imposed by the
hosting state where researchers violate local or international standards of
ethical conduct in experimental research.95
Investigators are required to work with ethical review committees to
ensure that there is no undue inducement to participate in research.96 They
are also required to recognize and exclude the possibility for potentially
coercive circumstances,9 which are defined as situations involving
deception,98 undue influence, 99 and intimidation.' 00 Intimidation in any
89 id.
90 Id. The Code does not address whether informed consent need be written. The
Declaration only requires that patients receive oral informed consent, written informed
consent is preferred, but is by no means required. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at
3044, para. 22. Written consent should never completely replace oral consent, but should be
used as supplemental to oral consent. Written consent in addition to oral consent seems
unnecessary, but serves as proof of patient consent. Many of the patients in Kano claimed
that they never consented to the research. See Tamar Lewin, Families Sue Pfizer on Test of
Antibiotic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001, at Cl. See WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 9,
guideline 6 (requiring written consent as the primary means of evidentiary compliance).
9' WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guidelines 2, 3.
92 id.
93 Id. guideline 19. Compensation is limited to "significant" injuries occurring in the
course of non-therapeutic research. Id. guideline 19 cmt. Compensation is not available to
those suffering from expected effects of treatment or predicted adverse effects made
available to the subject in informed consent. Id. Where the distinction is unclear as to
whether the purpose of the treatment is for research or therapy, the ethical review committee
determines which injuries will be compensated. Id.
94 See id. guideline 10.
95 Id. guideline 2 cmt. Ethical review committees will inform local authorities of
significant violations. Id.
96 Id. guideline 6, cmt. This supervision includes the ability to ensure that compensation
to patients does not unduly induce participation through unjustified deception, undue
influence, and intimidation. See id. guideline 7.
97 See id. guideline 4 cmt.
98 Deception can be used in certain circumstances in human subjects research, but is never
allowed when the risk to the participant is more than minimal. See id. guideline 6 cmt.
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form invalidates consent to participate. 10' The Guidelines further
acknowledge the possibility of circumstantial coercion by creating special
standards for underdeveloped countries and vulnerable persons. 
102
For research conducted in developed and underdeveloped countries,
investigators "must obtain the voluntary informed consent of the
prospective subject. .,1 Individuals must be informed in language they
can understand. 10 4 The Guidelines address community-consent issues by
urging researchers to obtain prior approval of research by community
leaders where community concerns are involved.
10 5
All participants in experimental research must give informed consent
to participate, 1°' unless the participant is not capable of giving informed
consent. The Guidelines define persons incapable of providing informed
consent as young children, persons with severe mental or behavioral
disorders 10 8 and prisoners. 09 In the case of children, researchers must take
special precautions to protect the child." l0 Consent must be obtained from
99 Undue influence, as explained in the Guidelines' commentary, can originate from the
physician, investigator or community leader. Id. It is not clear whether the Guidelines seek
to include external influences on the participant as possible sources of undue influence. See
id.
100 Id. guideline 6.
101 Id. guideline 6 cmt.
102 See id. guidelines 10, 13.
103 Id. guideline 4.
104 Id. guideline 5.
105 See id. guidelines 6 cmt., 8 cmt.
106 Id. guideline 4. The investigator must ensure that the patient understands the
information involved in consent to participate. Id. guideline 4 cmt. The importance of this
requirement increases as the risk involved increases. In some cases, investigators may be
required to conduct a test of the potential participant's understanding of the information
provided for consent. Id.
107 Id. guideline 4. As a general rule, consent should be written. Id. guideline 4 cmt. The
ethical review committee may waive written consent when the risk to subjects is minimal.
Id. Investigators bear the burden of proving oral consent. Id. The investigator is also
required to renew the consent of each subject if there are material changes in the conditions
or procedures of the research. Id. guideline 4 cmt., 6.
108 The Guidelines acknowledge that in some circumstances, the individual affected by a
mental or behavioral disorder may be considered by family members as a burden, thereby
casting suspicion on the consent of family members. See id. guideline 15 cmt. This may be
especially true where the individual has been committed to an institution. Id. Consent from
an ethical review committee, the institution, or a court may be necessary before involving
these individuals in experimental research. Id.
109 Id. guideline 4 cmt., 9 cmt.
1 10 See id. guideline 14. These precautions include a heightened level of assurance that
therapeutic benefit of the treatment is at least as advantageous to the individual as any
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the child to the extent of their capacity to understand."' A legal guardian
must supplement the child's consent even if the child has the capability to
understand the consequences of his or her decision.' 12 Where the child does
not possess the capacity to understand, proxy consent by a properly
authorized representative is sufficient.' ' 3 Involvement of children in the
experimental research must be justified by the benefit of potential results
specifically related to children." 4
Additional precautions are required for those deemed "vulnerable" or
for research conducted in underdeveloped countries."l5  "Special
justification" is required for research involving vulnerable individuals and
is combined with a strictly applied scrutiny of standards, in order to protect
the vulnerable individual's rights and welfare. 1 6  According to the
Guidelines, research conducted in underdeveloped countries requires the
physician make "every effort" to ensure that individual consent be
informed. " 7
II. Pfizer's Epidemic
In February of 1996, the World Health Organization posted on its
website news of an outbreak of cerebrospinal meningitis in northern
Nigeria, reporting over 3,000 cases and more than 400 deaths.1' 8 By
March, the number of cases reported counted 17,668 with 2,500 additional
deaths," 9 and thousands of reported cases were being added to the WHO's
available treatment. Id. guideline 14 cmt. Parental or legal guardian consent is required. Id.
guideline 14. The researcher must also respect the child's refusal to participate unless there
is no medically accepted alternative. Id. guideline 14 cmt. A child's right to refuse cannot
be overridden by proxy consent except for exigent circumstances. Id.
Id. guideline 14.
112 id.
113 See id. (this is inferred by the overriding objection capacity of parents and that consent
is sought to the extent it can be understood).
"14 Id. guideline 14.
115 See id. guidelines 10, 13.
116 Id. guideline 13.
117 Id. guideline 10.
118 World Health Org., Communicable Disease and Response (CSR), Cerebrospinal
Meningitis in Nigeria, Disease Outbreaks Reported (Feb. 19 1996), at
http://www.who.int/disease-outbreak-news/nl 996/feb/n 19febl 996c.html.
119 World Health Org., Communicable Disease and Response (CSR), Cerebrospinal
Meningitis in Nigeria - Update, Disease Outbreaks Reported (Mar. 7, 1996), at
http://www.who.int/disease-outbreak-news/n 1996/mar/n7marl996b.html.
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website on a weekly basis. 20 This epidemic ultimately left more than
18,000 victims suffering from the disease and claimed more than 3,000
lives.
121
After seeing the WHO reports, Pfizer came to Nigeria to test the
experimental drug Trovan,122 which had never been tested on children.' 23
Pfizer set up research headquarters next to an existing Doctors Without
Borders ("DWB") facility, using some of DWB's bed space and part of
DWB's treatment center in order to speed up the experimental trial
process. 124 Pfizer researchers also hired out many of the physicians and
medical assistants who were previously working with DWB and the local
hospital in Kano to help translate and facilitate patient care. 125 The Pfizer
doctors were not prepared for a city of more than two million people
ravaged by pollution, disease and death. 26 With only two weeks in Kano,
researchers treated just under two hundred children for spinal meningitis,
with half the children using either an oral or intravenous form of Trovan.
27
The remaining half were treated with the antibiotic Ceftriaxone, a drug
already approved for use on American children.1
28
At first, the Pfizer doctors only wanted the most treatable children, but
as the epidemic raged on, the researchers began treating any child arriving
at their doors. 129 The ages of the children participating in the experiment
ranged from a few months to eleven years; the severity of infection varied
from early stages to partial paralysis to near death. 30 Many cases involved
children who, despite showing progressing stages of infection, continued
treatment from trial doctors using oral doses of Trovan and ultimately
120 Compare Communicable Disease and Response (CSR), Cerebrospinal Meningitis in
Nigeria, Disease Outbreaks Reported, supra note 118, with Communicable Disease and
Response (CSR), Cerebrospinal Meningitis in Nigeria - Update, Disease Outbreaks
Reported, supra note 119.
121 Warsh, supra note 2, at C 1; Families: Pfizer Hurt, Killed Kids, supra note 2.
122 Stephens, supra note 3.
123 Id. Trovan was not approved at the time of the outbreak for human experimentation in
the United States. In fact, Trovan has been one of the few drugs in the last five years that
has been withdrawn from the U.S. market due to known serious side effects. Washburn,
supra note 17, at 18.
124 Stephens, supra note 3.
125 See id.
126 id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 id.
130 See id. Some physicians argue that it is inappropriate to condemn Pfizer's researchers
where the participating patients' cause of death is identical to the natural effects of the
disease. See Eferaro, supra note 6.
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succumbed to the disease.' 3' Due to the vast number of patients treated in
such a short time and the high illiteracy rate in Kano, many of the patients
did not sign consent forms. 32 Using nurses as translators, many of the
patients consented verbally; but often, the nurses did not translate all the
details of the consent form to the families.133 Pfizer's humanitarian venture
resulted in the deaths of eleven of the ninety-nine children given one form
of Trovan or another; 134 several more were left brain damaged, deaf or
paralyzed. 3
5
IlI. Analysis of Current Standards Under Pfizer's Epidemic
A. Voluntary Consent
Article One of the Nuremberg Code requires that patients give consent
to experimental research. 136 The patient's right to consent is absolute above
all else, including any other humanitarian end that might be attained
through the scientific knowledge derived from the trials. 37  The Code
requires voluntary consent in experimental research to contain three
independent but equally important elements: 1) that consent be voluntary
and the patient be adequately informed of the nature of the experimentation
and the risks involved in experimentation; 2) that voluntary consent be free
from coercion or duress; and 3) that participants have the legal capacity to
give voluntary consent. 38 The Code's strongest point, and greatest flaw, is
that it is extremely definitive on the issue of voluntary consent. 139 The
131 Stephens, supra note 3. One case involved a seven year-old boy whose face had been
partially paralyzed by the disease and was given fifty milligrams of the oral form of Trovan.
Id. Within nine hours the child died from effects related to meningitis. Id.
132 See id.
133 Id. (One of the Pfizer doctors explained, "[l]t was a general explanation.... It is very
complicated for them. You explain to them it's a new medicine and you have a right to say
no.").
134 See Nigerian Doctor Says Pfizer Used Illegal Approval for Human Tests, FLA. TIMES-
UNION (Jacksonville, FL), Jan. 16, 2001, at A6, available at 2001 WL 6999948.
135 Kevin Gopal, FDA Stays Silent on Trovan Charges, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE,
Oct. 1, 2001, at 24; 'Why we Sued Pfizer in US', supra note 11.
136 "The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that
the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent ... " Nuremberg Code, supra
note 40, at art. 1; see Sebring, Beals & Crawford, supra note 16, at 298.
137 Sebring, Beals & Crawford, supra note 16, at 298-99.
138 Nuremberg Code, supra note 40, at art. 1.
139 The issue of voluntary consent was, in fact, one of the foremost in the minds of those
participating in the trials of the Nazi physicians, as is evidenced by its placement in the
Code. See Sebring, Beals & Crawford, supra note 16, at 298.
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Code approaches voluntary consent through a moral approach, requiring
absolute voluntary consent from subjects because of society's demands for
personal autonomy. 140 The Declaration and the Guidelines similarly require
voluntary consent of research subjects, but approach the matter in varying
measures. The Declaration approaches voluntary consent through the
doctor-patient relationship. The Guidelines view voluntary consent through
the status of the patient and the surrounding circumstances.
i. Informed Consent
Article One of the Code not only requires that a patient know that the
experimental research is experimental, but also requires that each patient
comprehend the nature and extent of the experiment.14 ' Patients should be
able to make an "enlightened decision" based upon information provided by
researchers that explains the purpose of the experiment, duration, methods,
and means involved. 42  The Code places responsibility on the persons
engaging, directing, or initiating the experiment to ensure comprehension
by each patient taking part. 4 3  The Code does not acknowledge the
difficulty in obtaining informed consent where the patient does not
completely understand the complexities of experimental procedures.
Where many of the patients are uneducated or unfamiliar with Western
medicine, the Code would prohibit their involvement in experimental
research if they are unable to understand the procedures involved or the
nature and aims of the research. 44 In this way, the Code impedes medical
progress on entire populations deemed unable to comprehend the research.
The Code fails to take into account cultural variations for what can be
considered consent. In many developing countries, it is customary for
community leaders to give consent on behalf of its citizens. 141 If strictly
adhered to, the Code would not permit community consent to take the place
of individual consent.' 46 The Code mandates that only persons with legal
capacity to give consent may participate in experimental research. 47 Some
national cultures desire to preserve roles of decision-making affecting the
140id.
141 Nuremberg Code, supra note 40, at art. 1.
142 id.
143 id.
" See id.
141 "At the individual level, what constitutes informed consent may vary by culture. A
continuing practice exists in which people visiting a traditional healer show unquestioning
trust in the healer's diagnosis and prescriptions for treatment. The contract between parties
is based on this trust." Ankrah & Gostin, supra note 20, at 549.
146 See Nuremberg Code, supra note 40, at art. 1.
147 Id.
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public good by only allowing leaders of the community to make consent
decisions. 148  Some patriarchal cultures prohibit females from making
important decisions affecting either themselves or their children.1 49 While
deference to some cultural practices may not seem acceptable to Western
cultures, these countries may not desire to change custom15° for a Western
corporation's procedural requirement.1 5' Because of its rigidity in refusing
to consider situations that warrant using community consent instead of
individual consent, 152 the Code is not highly favored by the medical
community or by developing countries. Under the Code, Pfizer would have
not been allowed to substitute the consent of the community for that of any
individual.
53
The Declaration requires that individuals be informed of the aims,
methods, benefits, and risks that experimental research may entail. 54
Where the Code failed to address the issue that additional information could
be provided to the subject,1 55 the Declaration explains that it is the duty of
the physician to inform the patient of potential conflicts of interest on the
part of the physician conducting the experiment and the institutional
affiliations of the researchers. 156 This requirement addresses the need for
148 "Except among the urban and educated, gaining the individual's informed consent
instead of being guided by the family's wishes is new to many Africans. The potential for a
conflictual interplay is generated between cultural practices instituted by preliterate societies
and those introduced from more modem settings." Ankrah & Gostin, supra note 20, at 549.
149 See Macklin, supra note 68, at 251.
150 "The ethical and legal issues raised with respect to consent in diverse cultures require
an appreciation of the values held by a specific community, while at the same time
upholding the universality of the right of all people to make decisions about their own bodies
and health." Ankrah & Gostin, supra note 20, at 549.
151 "People become confused when .. . emphasis is for the first time placed on
individuals' permission to receive a certain treatment or to have their blood tested. This
transfer of decision-making power from healers to individuals may represent a departure
from tradition." Id. But see B.O. Osuntokun, Individual Consent: A Perspective of
Developing Countries, in ETHICS AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS: INTERNATIONAL
GUIDELINES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE XXVITH CIOMS CONFERENCE 25, 29 (Z. Bankowski &
R.J. Levine eds., 1993) ("The assertion that in some central African cultures the concept of
personhood differs fundamentally from that in Western culture ... is not true of most parts
of Black Africa.").
151 WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 4 cmt. ("In no case, however, may
thepermission of a community leader or other authority substitute for individual informed
consent.").
153 See Nuremberg Code, supra note 40, at art. 1.
154 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3044, para. 22.
155 Because physicians created the Declaration, rather than judges, it identifies procedural
problems and conflicts that arise in practice that judges would not be aware of until after the
fact.
156 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3044, para. 22.
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clarity within the doctor-patient relationship when conducting experimental
research in extreme circumstances. Patients who are informed of the
institutional affiliations of researchers are given the ability to discern
between institutions providing care and those conducting research. By
providing the institutional affiliations of researchers, patients can base their
decision on additional factors not directly related to the research, such as
the local reputation of the company conducting ethical research. 
57
Even though the researcher must reveal institutional affiliations, the
informed requirement of consent should not end there. These requirements
serve to clarify the doctor-patient relationship only if patients are made
aware that the nature of the research is experimental. 58 The Declaration
uses the word "aims" to describe the type of experimentation used.
However, the word "aims" describes any aspirational ends that researchers
seek to derive from the research; whereas a description that research is
experimental alludes to the means used by researchers to achieve their
aspirational ends. The Declaration's use of the word "methods" would lead
a researcher to convey technical or procedural aspects of the research. It
would not induce a researcher to convey the experimental nature of the
research to the patient. There is no explicit requirement in the Declaration
for doctors to reveal the experimental nature of the research to potential
patients. 159
While not specifically addressing community consent, the Declaration
does allow for doctors to follow national laws. 60 However, if a nation does
not codify the concept of community consent within its laws, researching
physicians are left without direction when dealing with communities that
traditionally allow community consent. Similar difficulties arise in
distinguishing between individuals who are part of a community that has
157 This information becomes even more important as locals can become wary of
institutions conducting research in their area. In Kano, for example, many locals are
refusing to accept aid due to Pfizer's research problems. See How Cholera Wreaked Havoc
in Kano, AFRICA NEWS, Nov. 28, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Africa News
File.
158 When the nature of the research is not disclosed, there is a danger that locals will be
wary of future efforts associated with the non-disclosing company, even if those efforts are
purely charitable.
159 See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3044, para. 22. It is interesting to note
that the Declaration switches between "should" and "must" when addressing informed
consent. A researcher "must" inform potential patients of aims, methods, etc; but a
researcher "should" obtain freely-given consent after informing the patient. Researchers
obtain consent from the community, inform each patient according to the requirements of the
Declaration, and do not worry about whether individual consent was obtained. In this
manner, according to the situation as described in this paper, patients "volunteer" for
experimental procedures without ever realizing the nature of the research and without ever
giving consent. It is through this very loophole that Pfizer slipped while in Kano.
160 See id. at 3043, para. 9.
2003]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
already given consent and from individuals whose communities have not
rendered consent for treatment.
Community consent clashes with the Declaration's poligc that
individuals personally volunteer for the experimental procedure., 6  The
need for consent is only implied in the Declaration through the requirement
that patients be volunteers. 62 At first glance, consent for participation in
research seems absolutely necessary. However, as in Pfizer's case, where
experimental research sits side by side with charitable medical services
without sufficient clarity or separation, a patient may "volunteer" as a
subject for research without purposefully "volunteering. 1 63  A subject
entering into facilities where medical treatment is being provided to those
in need by charitable organizations could easily mistake the experimental
research for treatment by the charitable organization and "volunteer" for the
experimental research, thus disposing of the need for researchers to obtain
consent. 164 In communities subscribing to community consent, doctors
performing experimental research under the Declaration of Helsinki are not
required to obtain consent from every individual. According to the Code 165
and the Guidelines,166 in communities subscribing to community consent,
physicians should seek to obtain the consent of every individual, allowing
community consent to act as a supplement to consent, not as a substitute.167
The Declaration fails to make this distinction clear.
The WHO-CIOMS Guidelines address informed consent with all of
the same requirements as the Code and Declaration, but specify that
patients be informed in language they are capable of understanding.' 8 The
Guidelines enhance the protection of subjects by requiring investigators to
161 Id. at 3044, para. 20.
162 id.
163 Pfizer set up research headquarters next to an already present Doctors Without Borders
("DWB") facility, using some of DWB's bed space and part of DWB's treatment center in
order to speed up the experimental trial process. Stephens, supra note 3. Pfizer researchers
also hired out many of the physicians and medical assistants who were previously working
with Doctors Without Borders and the local hospital in Kano to help facilitate in translation
and patient care. Id.
164 This situation is not a hypothetical. This kind of conduct is the very type that Pfizer
allegedly took part in while in Kano, Nigeria. Patients did not sign provided consent forms.
Id. Several patients did not know that they were part of experimental research. See id.
Many felt that they had been tricked into participating in the experiment because Pfizer set
up its research tent in close proximity to the Doctors Without Borders tent. Id.
165 See Nuremberg Code, supra note 40, at art. 1.
'66 See WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 4 cmt.
167 Osuntokun, supra note 151, at 31.
168 WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 5.
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obtain community consent where local customs require such consent. 169
The burden of ensuring patient understanding is placed on the physician,
who must verify' the understanding of a patient by administering a test to
the participant. 70 If the physician is to take the role of investigator in
obtaining informed consent, the physician is required to inform the patient
of this role to clarify the doctor-patient relationship.1 7' These requirements
assure that the patient will understand the nature of the research and that
patients are not somehow tricked into participation through
misunderstanding or faulty communication.
The Guidelines do not directly address community consent, clearly
stating that each individual participating in experimental research must give
informed consent' 72 The Guidelines' comments specifically provide that
community consent can play a role in informed consent, particularly when
dealing with difficult questions of public policy or research involving
minimal risk. 173 Under the Guidelines, Pfizer would not have been allowed
to substitute community consent for individual consent because the risks to
the participants were so great. 1
74
ii. Coercion
Voluntary consent, as described in article one of the Code, requires
patients involved in experimental research be free from "any element of
force, fraud, deceit, duress . ..or other ulterior form of constraint or
coercion."1 75 The absolute nature of voluntary consent allows little room
for variation. The Code fails to mention mitigating or exculpatory
circumstances wherein consent need not be completely voluntary. The
Code's strict demand that all consent be absolutely untainted by external
influence rejects the possibility that some level of coercion could legally
exist in drastic circumstances and still preserve the patient's right to remain
free to choose. This view of experimental procedure ignores the inherent
coercion involved in certain types of experimental research. Such black
and white exclusion of all research involving any element of coercion
169 Id. guideline 4 cmt. The commentary clarifies that only informed consent may be
supplemental and that voluntary consent must be individual. Id.
170 See id.
11 See id. guideline 5.
172 Id. guideline 4.
173 Community consent is appropriate, if not necessary, where information is obtained that
would subject a community to stigmatization. See id. guideline 8 cmt. Such studies include
research in epidemiology, sociology, and genetics. See id.
174 See id. guideline 4 cmt. (stating that an ethical review committee may waive certain or
all provisions of informed consent if there is only a minimal risk posed to the participant).
175 Nuremberg Code, supra note 40, at art. 1.
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would only achieve the undesired result of eliminating a great quantity of
safe, effective experimental research.
Experimental research is sometimes needed for the benefit of a patient
whose life depends on the success of the researcher. 76 In such situations
there is a degree of external coercion placed upon a patient who is faced
with no other alternative than to suffer the effects of his or her malady or to
participate in experimental medical procedures. 77 It is generally accepted
that certain circumstances exist where voluntary consent might be
waived. 78 These circumstances usually exist in the form of emergency
experimental research. U.S. courts have held that "a physician should not
subject patients to a 'mere experiment ... save possibly when the patient is
in extremis, and fatal results substantially certain unless the experiment
may succeed."",179 Emergency research situations typically involve doctors
performing experimental procedures or research only when no other known
alternative exists and the patient's life hangs in the balance. 80 In such
situations, the patient may not have the ability to enter into voluntary
consent due to the required spontaneity of the research or the duty of the
physician to save the patient's life, thus requiring the attending physician to
forego consent and administer the treatment. Such medical necessity
should be viewed as exculpatory for an omission to obtain voluntary
consent. '
8
'
There exists in any therapeutic research 82 an element of coercion
where the patient suffers from disease or other maladies and the outcome or
176 Norman Fost, Waived Consent for Emergency Research, 24 AM. J.L & MED. 163, 183
(1998).
177 See id. at 176 (discussing the reduction of efficacy of consent in emergency settings);
see also, George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal, and Self-Deception in
Postmodern Medical Research, in HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A READER 312, 317
(Jonathan M. Mann et al eds., 1999) (noting that researchers during the Cold War did not
obtain consent from the terminally ill because they could not be further harmed).
178 See generally Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human
Experimentation and the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 63 (1993).
179 Id. at 72 (quoting Allen v. Voje, 89 N.W. 924, 932 (Wis. 1902)).
Iso See id. at 74.
1s The existence of one exculpatory circumstance for requiring voluntary consent begs
for further investigation into whether other circumstances might possibly mitigate or further
exculpate the absolute necessity for a patient's voluntary consent. In this respect, the Code
falls short, and regulation is needed to clarify requisite behavior in clinical trials regarding
voluntary consent.
182 1 will define therapeutic research is research involving the treatment of an individual
suffering from the malady under investigation.
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ultimate effect of the treatment is unsure. 183 Coercion, however, is offset
by assurances from the treating physicians of adequate alternate treatment
pending failure of the experimental procedure. In non-therapeutic research,
the coercive effect can be offset by financial means.1 84 Such reassured and
guaranteed coercive elements are seen as ethical under the laws of most
countries when the benefits of the experimentation outweigh the risks.
Regardless of the nature of the research, the Code disallows any type
of coercion or duress in obtaining consent or in participating in
experimental research, 85 thus preventing doctors from entering into
situations where they can not guarantee patients alternate treatment in spite
of patients' participation in the research process.1 86  This is especially
relevant in developing countries where necessary medical treatment is not
always available to every person. The lack of options available to the
patient could be seen as unethical due to the external influence on the
patients' decision to participate in research procedures, 87 and could result
in the loss of an opportunity to conduct legitimate research. This outcome
is drastic and harsh on medical progress.
The Declaration addresses coercion as it relates to the doctor-patient
relationship but fails to address external sources of coercion, such as an
epidemic, that could influence patients in their decision to participate in
experimental research. The Declaration provides that "special attention is
required for those who may be subject to giving consent under duress."'' 88
The "special attention" provision of the Declaration only provides a remedy
for coercive circumstances within a doctor-patient relationship;' 89 the
Declaration does not address the possibility of externally coercive elements
arising outside of the doctor-patient relationship. If a coercive situation
arises within the doctor-patient relationship, a third party not participating
in the investigation and not a party to the doctor-patient relationship may
obtain consent to participate from the patient.'
90
While requiring that all participants in experimental research be
volunteers, 19' the Declaration fails to address external sources of coercion
183 For a more complete discussion on coercion in therapeutic research see Annas, supra
note 177, at 312.
184 In some respects, offering monetary compensation for participation in experimental
research (especially in poorer populations) is coercive ... much like holding a carrot in front
of a horse.
185 Nuremberg Code, supra note 40, at art. 1.
186 Id. at art. 5.
187 See WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 21 cmt.
188 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3043, para. 8.
189 Id. at 3044, para. 23.
190 Id.
191 Id. at para. 20.
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in the patients' decision-making process, thereby not sufficiently protecting
patients. As one doctor working with Doctors Without Borders in Kano at
the time of the meningitis outbreaks stated:
It's an emergency situation-an epidemic situation-and you are
trying a drug that has not been tested. It raises a lot of moral an ethical
questions, especially in an illiterate environment. Imagine coming to the
hospital, a poor man hearing that there is this thing they want to give to
your kid and it's free. At that time, you'll sign anything.' 2
The failure of the Declaration to specify a physician's need to
recognize external sources of coercion effectively disperses the physician's
burden to protect the individual from coercion to participate in experimental
research.
The Declaration carefully addresses the topic of therapeutic research,
seeking to protect participants when their well-being is at stake. The
Declaration clarifies that when therapy is combined with research,
additional standards apply. 93  These additional standards are explicitly
given to protect the rights of the patient. 94 According to the additional
standards, researchers bear the burden of showing that the benefits of the
research outweigh the risks as compared "against those of the best current
prophylactic, diagnostic, and therapeutic methods."' 95 The Declaration also
requires physicians conducting therapeutic research make available the best
treatment to participants at the conclusion of the research. 1
96
Conducting therapeutic research during an epidemic presents the
additional problem of conflicting objectives within the doctor-patient
relationship.
[C]Iinical research is an activity designed to produce generalizable
knowledge through the application of procedures of potential diagnostic or
therapeutic value to those involved as patient-subjects; and non-therapeutic
research is an activity designed to produce generalizable knowledge
through the application of procedures without the intention of directly
benefiting those involved as subjects. 197
192 Sam Eferaro, supra note 6.
193 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3044, para. 28.
194 id
195 Id. at 3045, para. 29 (emphasis added). The standard for research without therapy
takes into account the "predictable risks and burdens in comparison with foreseeable benefits
to the subject or to others." Id. at 3044, para. 16 (emphasis added).
196 Id. at 3045, para. 30.
197 Alexander M. Capron, Different Compensation Approaches to Bad Outcomes from
Standard Treatment, Innovative Treatment, and Research, in MEDICAL INNOVATION AND
BAD OUTCOMES: LEGAL, SOCIAL AND ETHICAL RESPONSES 145, 149 (Mark Siegler et al. eds.,
1987).
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The object of a doctor-patient relationship for the researcher in
experimental research is "not the marketplace, but the laboratory. The
object of ... [the] visit . . . [is] not commerce but research on human
beings."'1 98 The objectives of patients in developing countries during an
epidemic are therapeutic. As one Nigerian doctor in Kano pointed out,
"[t]he patients did not know if it was research or not... [t]hey just knew
they were sick." 199 Because the ends to commercial research efforts are
primarily for profit, and the ends for volunteers participating are
therapeutic, volunteers participating in the experimental research in such
drastic settings are bound to be confused where charitable efforts are
working side by side with for-profit research.
The Guidelines acknowledge the need for researchers to provide
participants with some sort of compensation to keep profit and therapeutic
ends rigidly separate. 200 "Researchers from developed countries who seek
to conduct clinical trials in Africa instead of in their home countries should
provide special justification. In particular, the research must meet all
international ethical requirements and confer a benefit on the African
,,201
community.
Research participants are usually given some sort of consideration for
their participation, even when the research results may be therapeutic in
nature. This consideration usually comes in the form of monetary
compensation.0 2 However, when applied to a situation in an impoverished,
developing country, foreign money could be seen as an "undue influence"203
for participation. Many of the participants involved in the research in
Kano were in poverty.20 4 Offers of foreign financial aid and a quick fix
might induce those more in need of monetary than medical assistance to
take part in the research, leaving out those who stand in real need.205 A
198 Smith v. United States, 412 F.2d 791, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1969) (Hufstedler, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
199 Stephens, supra note 3.
200 See WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 7.
201 Ankrah & Gostin, supra note 20, at 555.
202 See WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, guideline 7.
203 See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3043, para. 13; see also WHO-CIOMS
Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 10 cmt. (stating the concern that countries with limited
resources will be vulnerable to exploitation by wealthy countries).
204 See Sarah Boseley, Ailing Ethics: A Clinical Trial Raises Disturbing Questions about
Drug Companies'Activities in Africa, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 20, 200 1, at 20. "It is
unjust to selectively recruit impoverished people to serve as research subjects simply
because they can be more easily induced to participate in exchange for small payments."
WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 12 cmt.
205 The concept of overuse of patients for research is approached in the WHO-CIOMS
Guidelines. The Guidelines recognize the need to diversify those used in research, so as not
to place the burden of research entirely on one class. Id. It is suggested that offering large
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better idea would be to provide additional medical care for those
participating in the research. A staff dentist, optometrist, or general
physician might accompany the group to perform routine physicals and
other more basic medical procedures for those participating in the research
activities.2 °6  Care should be limited to basic medical needs. This is
necessary to maintain the separation from other care-giving groups. Extra
care given those volunteers participating in the experimental research
should be explicitly separate from the care given to others, so as not to
confuse purely charitable efforts with for-profit research.
The WHO-CIOMS Guidelines require that "special justification" be
given for the participation of vulnerable subjects in experimental
research.20 7 The "special justification" provision in the Guidelines is
similar to the Declaration's "special attention," but the Guidelines require
that the rights and welfare of vulnerable patients be "strictly applied.,
20 8
The rights of freedom from coercion for patient participants are clearly
provided in the Guidelines, and the extra requirement of strict application of
patient rights and welfare rightly places the burden on the physician to
ensure the protection of vulnerable patients. Taking into account external
sources of coercion and protecting patients in dire health or extreme
poverty, 0 9 the Guidelines not only require that physicians recognize
potential economic coercion, but provide specific guidelines for physicians
210
conducting research in these circumstances. Physicians may provide
compensation for patients' participation in research, including free medical
services, so long as it does not produce "undue inducement., 21 1 The
Guidelines also stipulate that any reimbursements for participation be
approved by an ethical committee. 212  This limitation takes excessive
discretion out of the exclusive control of physicians conducting the
research.
The fact that the subjects of Pfizer's research were children is one of
the main concerns with Pfizer's research in Nigeria.21 3  The Code
amounts of money for compensation on a consistent basis would expose the community to
overuse. Id.
206 See id. guidelines 7 cmt., 21 cmt (stating that unrelated health care services may be
performed free of charge and, while not required, offering these services is "morally
praiseworthy").
207 Id. guideline 13.
208 Id.
209 For example, the Guidelines require that children consent to experimental research, but
if the child is very young and immature the parents of the child can override the child's
refusal to participate when no other available treatments exist. Id. guideline 14 cmt.
210 See id. guideline 7.
211 id.
212 id.
213 See Stephens, supra note 3.
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incidentally addresses research focused on vulnerable groups such as those
lacking "legal capacity" to consent.21 4 The Declaration does little to
provide a clear definition of which persons are to be considered vulnerable.
The only standard given to clarify the Declaration's coverage of persons to
be afforded "special attention" is that of the economically disadvantaged:
those who cannot give consent themselves; those giving consent under
duress; or those involved in therapeutic research. 21 This application of
"special attention" does not give much instruction on protection from
coercion provided to these groups.21 6 The Guidelines, on the other hand,
specifically provide that children are considered vulnerable persons,217 give
specific actions for researchers to follow, and the mandate that procedures
and protections for children be "strictly applied.,
218
iii. Capacity to Understand
The Code fails to address the possibility of proxy consent for minors
or other groups unable to comprehend informed consent. All subjects are
required to understand the research in which they are participating and the
consequences of their decision.219 Because much research is complex and
has potentially fatal consequences for the subject providing consent, it can
be reasonably said that the Code prohibits experimentation on minors
unable to comprehend their situations. Such an interpretation is hardly
feasible if medical science is to progress in the area of pediatric medicine.
In this sense, the Code is too strict and unbending to be of any practicable
use for regulating experimental research on minors. The subject of proxy
consent for minors is yet another reason why the medical community, as
214 Nuremberg Code, supra note 40, at art. 1.
215 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3043, para. 8 ("Some research populations
are vulnerable and need special protection. The particular needs of the economically and
medically disadvantaged must be recognized. Special attention is also required for those
who cannot give or refuse consent for themselves, for those who may be subject to giving
consent under duress, for those who will not benefit personally from the research and for
those for whom the research is combined with care.").
216 Another problem with the Declaration's broad definition of vulnerable groups is that
the Declaration leaves ambiguous terms to national or local interpretation. Many developing
countries do not legally recognize any group as vulnerable, giving the Declaration's "special
attention" provision little, if any, effect.
217 WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 13 cmt.
218 See id. guidelines 13, 14. The Guidelines also delineate between ages of children as
their ability to understand increases and susceptibility to coercion lessens. See id. guideline
14 cmt. (stating that older children who are more capable of giving consent should be
selected before younger children).
219 Nuremberg Code, supra note 40, at art. 1.
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well as many developing nations, have refused to acknowledge the Code as
anything more than suggestive.
The Declaration's focus on understanding and competency is perhaps
its strongest point. The Declaration recognizes the vulnerability of groups
of people who lack the ability to adequately understand the complexities of
participation in experimental treatments, specifically minor children. °
Researchers seeking participants considered "vulnerable" are to give
"special attention" for protecting participants' rights.22' Researchers are
instructed to obtain informed consent from each individual deemed
vulnerable, including children.222 With individuals lacking the capacity to
give informed consent, the researcher is required to obtain informed
consent from the legal guardian.2 3
The Declaration's policy of adhering to local law for legal standards
governing vulnerable individuals is problematic because interpretation of
ambiguity in the Declaration's standard is left to local laws. 224  When
conducting experimental research in developing countries, the Declaration
requires doctors to conduct their research under the supervision of a
national or local independent review board to ensure adherence to national
and local standards. Oftentimes, however, developing nations lack
guidelines for or even fail to provide an independent review board.225
Because national laws in developing countries are often much less stringent
than those in developed nations, physicians conducting experimental
research encounter ve 7 few laws providing definitions of legal competency
for ethical research.22 This leaves researching doctors without adequate
guidance while conducting research.
Many of the parents of the children participating in the Pfizer research
claimed that they did not understand that their children were participating in
experimental research.227 Perhaps Pfizer's doctors only obtained consent
from the children participating in the research, failing to adequately inform
220 See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3044, paras. 24-26.
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 Id. at para. 24.
224 See id. at 3043, para. 13.
225 Such was the case with Pfizer. Several of the Nigerian doctors working with Pfizer
later admitted that there was no ethical review board present at the hospital where Pfizer was
conducting its experiments. In fact, the hospital's medical director later admitted that an
ethical committee was created only after Pfizer had left and that the documents from the
hospital's ethical committee permitting Pfizer to conduct its experimentation in Kano were
created after Pfizer left Kano. Boseley, supra note 6.
226 See Stephens, supra note 3.
227 See id.
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the parents of the nature of the research.228 Whether the ethical review
board in charge of supervision failed in its capacity to inform Pfizer's
doctors about local laws regarding competency of minors or whether local
laws defining competency of minors simply did not exist at the time, the
charge that Pfizer's doctors failed to recognize the need for supplemental
consent serves to illustrate the Declaration's practical weaknesses. The
Declaration adequately addresses theoretical issues of competency and
understanding of the research subject, but fails in its practical application.
The Guidelines require "special justification" for including vulnerable
individuals in experimental research, and require strict protection of
vulnerable patients' rights and welfare once included.22 9 The Guidelines
don't leave vulnerability questions open to interpretation by physicians, but
provide specific categories of individuals considered "vulnerable,, 230 and
further subdivide vulnerable groups for clarification.
231
The Guidelines provide detailed requirements for physicians to follow
to protect the rights and interests of the vulnerable patient. Ethical
justification of the involvement of vulnerable subjects requires researchers
to respond to an ethical review committees' inquiry regarding: (1) whether
the research could not be carried out with less vulnerable subjects; (2)
whether the research will lead to improved diagnosis, prevention, or
treatment of diseases unique to the vulnerable class; (3) whether members
of the vulnerable class will be assured access to diagnostic, preventive, or
therapeutic products that will become available as a consequence of the
research; (4) whether the risks attached to research will be minimal; and (5)
whether researchers will obtain supplemental proxy consent from legal
guardians.232
The Guidelines provide special protection for children as
vulnerable subjects, requiring that each child consent to research and
228 See 'Why We Sued Pfizer in US', supra note 11.
229 WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 13.
230 These include children, elderly, persons suffering from life-threatening diseases,
persons interned in long-term care facilities, etc. Id. guideline 13 cmt.
231 The subdivisions are: 1) Those who would be capable of informed consent but are not
given the right to the necessary autonomy by their own society at large; examples are
women, handicapped people, and prisoners; 2) those who might be unduly influenced or
tricked into consent unless very special precaution is taken to present simple and clear
information: examples are members of communities unfamiliar with modem medical
concepts; 3) those who, under any circumstances, might not be capable of informed consent;
examples are children, and many of the mentally ill; 4) those dependent upon the researchers
for their livelihood or studies; examples are medical students. C. de Sweemer-Ba, Informed
Consent: Protecting the Vulnerable, in ETHICS AND RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS:
INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE XXVITH CIOMS CONFERENCE 36, 37 (Z.
Bankowski & R.J. Levine eds., 1993).
232 WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 13 cmt.
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requiring that the purpose of the research be to obtain knowledge
specifically relevant to the health needs of children.233 Additional issues
addressed include: the maturity of the child; the age of the child; and the
ability of parents to override a child's refusal to treatment when there is no
available alternative.234 The Guidelines allow parental supplemental
consent to be procedurally governed by the local government, but
supplemental consent of the child's parents is essential, independent of
local requirements.235 The Guidelines also provide that older children
should be used for research before younger children.236
The Guidelines require, through the doctrine of "responsiveness" 237
that any positive benefits received from the experimental research be
provided to the community from which the information was extracted.238
The commentary to Guideline 10 further explains, "[t]his is especially the
case when research is conducted in countries where governments lack the
resources to make such products widely available." This requirement
assures that while certain communities may be vulnerable to exploitation,
abuse will be minimal by providing vulnerable communities with needed
care. Part of the reason for outrage against Pfizer was that Pfizer came,
conducted its research and left, 240 leaving patients feeling that they had been
used and had not been given sufficient care.24'
B. Enforcement
The Code seeks to punish criminal behavior,242 but fails to set a
standard for behavior that is not antisocial or even necessarily intentional.
In many cases, civil liability may well suit the bill to serve the demands of
justice. Where behavior by experimenting physicians leaves criminal
jurisdiction and approaches medical malpractice is a line not clearly
marked, and in fact, may not be even considered by the Nuremberg Code.
233 Id. guideline 14, cmt.
234 See id. guideline 14 cmt.
235 See id.
236 Id. This was one of Pfizer's problems in conducting their research. Patients seeking
help began to pour into the hospital where Pfizer was camped. As the numbers rapidly grew,
Pfizer stopped distinguishing patients on the basis of their age. See Stephens, supra note 3.
237 WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 10, cmt.
238 Id. guideline 10.
2 3 9 1d. guideline 10 cmt. The commentary further provides that if the benefits of the
research are "used primarily for the benefit of populations that can afford the tested product,
the research may rightly be characterized as exploitative and, therefore, unethical." Id.
240 See Stephens, supra note 3.
241 See id.
242 See Annas, supra note 177, at 314-16.
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The Code does not address the need for supervision and enforcement
of experimental research in developing countries. The need becomes
apparent when faced with the facts of Pfizer's case. When confronted with
accusations of abuse, the Pfizer researchers produced evidence of
permission to conduct the research project from the local ethical oversight
committee in the Kano regional hospital. 43 However, one of the doctors at
the hospital in Kano alleged that there was no ethical oversight committee
at the hospital at the time Pfizer came to Kano and further alleged that
Pfizer never had permission to conduct research in Kano.24 The doctor
further alleged that Pfizer forged the evidence of permission and backdated
individual consent forms.245 Finally, when doctors in Kano tried to report
Pfizer's conduct to national authorities, their request for audience was
dismissed without reason.246 Similarly, the suit brought in Nigeria has
experienced recent publicity due to its problems in getting underway.
Lawyers on both sides, judges, and clients have consistently failed to
appear on the trial date.24 Recently, the lawyers handling the Pfizer suit
explained their decision to bring suit in the U.S. was influenced by Pfizer's
political influence in Nigeria and repeated procedural difficulties in
Nigerian courts.248
The Declaration does not provide a legal standard for the enforcement
of its provisions. The Declaration places enforcement of its standards on
local ethical oversight committees. 249 However, many developing countries
do not have the ability, 250 resources, or political will2 5 1 to sufficiently
243 See Boseley, supra note 6; Joe Stephens, Doctors Say Drug Trial's Approval Was
Backdated, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2001, at Al.
244 Boseley, supra note 6. The Nigerian government later acknowledged that Pfizer had
obtained national permission to conduct experimental research, but no evidence has been
given to show that permission was obtained in Kano or that any kind of national or local
oversight was provided. See Sam Eferaro, NAFDAC Okayed Pfizer's Trovan Trials, AFRICA
NEWS, Jan. 8, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Africa News File.
245 Boseley, supra note 6; Stephens, supra note 243.
246 See Boseley, supra note 6; Stephens, supra note 243.
247 See Absence of Victim's Lawyer Stalls Pfizer Drug Case in Nigeria, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Apr. 5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2378421 (identifting travel problems for a
victim's lawyer). See also In Nigeria, Case Against Pfizer Over Meningitis Drugs
Adjourned, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 31, 2001.
248 'Why We Sued Pfizer in US', supra note 11.
249 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3043, para. 13.
250 See Karen DeYoung & Deborah Nelson, Latin America is Ripe for Trials, and Fraud:
Frantic Pace Could Overwhelm Controls, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2000, at Al (discussing
vulnerability of Latin America). Since April, when Pfizer's case was allowed in a Nigerian
federal court, multiple demonstrations by thousands of Nigerians have taken place due to the
common adjourning and rescheduling of the lawsuit against Pfizer. See In Nigeria, Case
Against Pfizer Over Meningitis Drugs Adjourned, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 31, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 2418513 (delaying of case due to a jurisdictional challenge).
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maintain ethical oversight committees. 2  Moreover, local laws do not
always prescribe the use of ethical oversight committees. 253 This looseness
of oversight-or non-existence thereof-further illustrates the Declaration's
lopsided intent to protect physicians conducting experimental research
abroad.
Another type of enforcement provided for in the Declaration is that of
political enforcement. Researchers are required to preserve accurate
records of their results, 254 and are urged to publish both positive and
negative results,255 as well as sources for funding and possible conflicts of
Nigerians are beginning to show distrust for the ability of their local courts to fairly try
claims. See Nigerian HIV/AIDS Drug Trial Delay, MARKETLETTER, Dec. 17, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 31103635 ("Pfizer's influence would have prevented justice."); see
also 'Why We Sued Pfizer in US'. supra note 11 (explaining that the reasons for choosing to
file suit in the U.S. were because Pfizer had influence in the Nigerian government and was
seeking to influence government decisions). Nigerians are beginning to show distrust in
their local governments to protect them from abusive research. Recently, reports have arisen
of the unwillingness of Nigerians to submit to experimental research, as well as other kinds
of treatment, including vaccinations, fearing that Western corporations and local
governments are not protecting the citizens. See Nigerian HIV/AIDS Drug Trial Delay,
supra. Many Nigerians are afraid of another "Trovan" incident.
251 During the 1990's, Nigeria's national government was overturned four times-once
since the meningitis epidemic in 1996-and only recently emerged from dictatorial military
rule. See Nigeria: Chronology of the Struggle for Stability and Democracy (Aug. 24, 2000),
at http://allafrica.com/stories/200008240352.html. In such highly dynamic times, adequate
governmental oversight and enforcement of ethical behavior can be difficult, if not
impossible. Id. Governments in constant flux do not have the budget or ability to police
every activity within its borders. Executive control is not the only problematic area during
governmental flux; the judicial branch also suffers from dynamic, drastic governmental
changes. In often-changing governments, there exists a greater potential for judicial
corruption and lack of organization. Newly created judiciaries lack experience and often
suffer from procedural difficulties, resulting in questionable behavior behind the bench.
This is nowhere more obvious than in Pfizer's Nigerian case.
252 Adding to the complexities of Pfizer's situation, default Islamic laws in Kano, in the
absence of national regulation, prohibit performing autopsies, thereby preventing any inquiry
as to the cause of death of patients involved in Pfizer's research. Yinka Olusanya &
Lawrence Ndukwe, Trovan: Records of 350 CSM Patients Vanish, AFRICA NEWS, Jan. 3,
2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Africa News File. But see Abdulziz Sachedina,
Islam, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1289, 1291 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995)
(stating that Islamic law permits autopsies if necessary for research needed to cure a
disease).
253 It is not clear whether an ethical oversight committee was required in Nigeria at the
time of the Pfizer incident in Kano, but the allegations of the absence of an ethical oversight
committee allow the inference that they are not required.
254 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at 3044, para. 27.
255 Id. Research language throughout the Declaration switches between 'must' and
'should,' varying with the degree of deference a doctor should give to the document. For
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interest. 256 The only suggested recourse against violations is that publishers
should not publish reports of experimentation found not to have complied
with the Declaration's standards. These remedies are hardly the makings
of legal enforcement, but more closely resemble professional regulation of
misconduct.
The WMA's Declaration of Helsinki appears to be solely interested in
protecting doctors' rights and in protecting the advance of science. Because
of its one-sided approach to regulation, the Declaration of Helsinki does not
provide adequate legal guidance to companies, but more closely resembles
a field manual for procedural policy. The loose, permissive language of the
Declaration supports this conclusion.258
The Guidelines state that every patient suffering accidental injury from
experimental research has the right to compensation. The Guidelines do
not provide for criminal liability, but do clarify that ethical review
committees do not have the power to impose sanctions on violations by
researchers.259 The ethical review committee has the duty to report any
significant violations to local or national governments or enforcement
entities.260  The Guidelines state that certain methods of control are
preferred, including the "cultivation of an atmosphere of mutual trust, and
education and support to promote in researchers and in sponsors the
capacity for ethical conduct of research., 261 In this respect, the Guidelines
shift its focus from the rights of the patient to the benefit of scientific
progress, doing much to deter abuse in experimental research, but little to
aid enforcement of international standards.
example, the Declaration requires that a patient be a volunteer, using the language, "subjects
must be volunteers and informed participants in the research project," leaving little wiggle
room for guesswork. Id. at para. 20 (emphasis added). However, in other areas, such as
possible remedies for coercion in a doctor-patient relationship, doctors are advised, "the
informed consent should be obtained by a well-informed physician who is not engaged in the
investigation and who is completely independent of this relationship." Id. at para. 23
(emphasis added).
256 Id. at para. 27.
257 id.
258 Again, the Declaration uses the permissive 'should' in describing the researchers' duty
to publish positive and negative results of their research. See id.
259 WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 2 cmt. The Guidelines adopt the
sanctions from the Declaration of Helsinki, but are less stringent in the area of publication,
finding that publication of results could benefit communities as well as science in general.
See id. Sanctions available include "fines or suspension of eligibility to receive research
funding, to use investigational interventions, or to practice medicine." Id.
260 Id.
26 11d
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None of the standards, including the Code,262 has been afforded the
weight of binding international law,263 but carry only suggestive or
persuasive weight in regulating conduct by doctors or in finding liability for
individuals accused of unethical experimental research.
The Code was meant to prescribe physician conduct to certain
minimums of ethical behavior as are required by universal moral, ethical
and legal concepts, the violation of which would bring down the
condemnation of society.2 64  Notwithstanding the intentions of the
prosecutors and judges at the Nuremberg trials to curtail unethical behavior
by doctors, application of the Code's standard has been nearly impossible.
Because of the contextualized nature265 of these trials, most doctors
conducting experimental research abroad worry little that their actions will
be comparable to the brutal experiments performed by the Nazi doctors.266
Because the Code has been applied in a real world setting, it carries an
air of authority that other international guidelines lack. The Code provides
a broad, bright-line definition of what is universally needed to conduct
ethical research in an international setting, but is largely inapplicable
because of its failure to address outlying 
considerations.267
While the Code has provided direction in the past, modem
circumstances require additional guidance to enlighten researchers. In
comparing the Pfizer case to the international standards found in the Code,
its shortcomings become more apparent. Patients in the Pfizer case were
not given a choice whether they would be among the patients selected to
take the drug already proven effective or those taking the experimental
262 The Nuremberg Code has been proposed as an international standard, but the Tribunal
was chiefly made up of American judges and lawyers. For this reason, many have argued
that the Nuremberg standard has never been officially sanctioned as international law. See
Miller, supra note 38, at 203.
263 Id. at 202. For an overview of treatment of Nuremberg's principles of international
law in the U.S. see Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347, 2359-60 (1991) (analyzing the history of U.S. court treatment of transnational public
law litigation).
264 Sebring, Beals & Crawford, supra note 16, at 297-98.
265 Many physicians feel that the Code only addresses human subject experimentation not
involving therapeutic needs of a patient. Therefore, much of the research being conducted
on patients actually suffering from the maladies being investigated was deemed as therapy,
not experimental research, thereby exempting physicians from following its precepts. See
Michelle D. Miller, The Informed-Consent Policy of the International Conference on
Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human
Use: Knowledge is the Best Medicine, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203 (1997).
266 See Ann E. Ryan, Protecting the Rights of Pediatric Research Subjects in the
International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 848, 869 (2000).
267 See Annas, supra note 177, at 315.
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drug.268 Alternate methods of obtaining medical help were not guaranteed
to those not participating in the test,269 tragically forcing patients to decide
whether to participate in the experimental research or take the chance of not•270
getting necessary treatment for their malady. Voluntary consent in this
setting is no longer completely voluntary. 27' The substance of the patient's
voluntary consent is diminished to a choice between the lesser of two evils.
When compared with the Nazi medical experimentation, however,
Pfizer's conduct does not measure up.272 While Pfizer's actions may have
been unethical, undesirable, or even criminal, they can only compare to the
Nazi experimental research in small degree. The Pfizer researchers
arguably had some legitimate benefit to society in mind, whereas many of
the Nazi experiments were conducted only for the pleasure of the treating
physicians.
Pfizer is not entirely free of guilt. Pfizer used an epidemic to conduct
experimental research on children. Pfizer created ad hoc experimental trials
to catch an epidemic while it still raged.274 Abandoning its patients after
only six weeks of treatment, the patients were left before they received
adequate help.275 It is difficult to even compare what was done by Nazi
physicians with what happened with the Pfizer researchers in Nigeria.
268 See Stephens, supra note 3.
269 See id.
270 The patient's decision-making ability is severely limited by the consequences of their
choice: death or permanent disability from lack of treatment, or an experimental treatment
whose most drastic consequences are equal to suffering without treatment. A reasonable
person may choose the experimental treatment over no treatment. As the lead doctor in
charge of research at Pfizer stated, "That was kind of a desperate time for them-they were
happy to have anyone come in and do just about any kind of work. Stephens, supra
note 3.
271 A patient still has the right to choose, but the substance of their consent is taken away
from them and transferred to the doctors conducting the experiment.
272 Professor Goldner, in distinguishing negligence in experimentation from criminal
intent in willfully causing harm, states, "'[T]he physician was acting in relatively good faith
for the benefit of the patient,' as opposed to the intentional antisocial malice that was seen as
being at the root of the concept of battery. " Goldner, supra note 178, at 76 (citing
Nathanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960)).
273 Taylor, supra note 27, at 70.
274 For a more descriptive analysis of the ethical considerations surrounding ad hoc
experimentation, see S. Rebecca Holmes-Farley & Michael A. Grodin, Law, Medicine and
Socially Responsible Research, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 153 (1998).
275 Administering experimental medicine to a suffering patient is not always better than
nothing at all. A partial treatment creates the illusion for other physicians that some
treatment has been provided, giving priority to other patients to receive proven treatment.
This is especially true where numbers of cases are high and medicine is in short supply.
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In the cases of the Nazi physicians and Pfizer, the Code fails to
distinguish between a crime against humanity and a lesser evil. The only
guidelines provided by the judges who created the Code are the conclusions
as to the Nazi physicians' intent and purpose in conducting the experiments,
stating: "We find from the evidence that in the medical experiments which
have been proved, these ten principles were much more frequently honored
in their breach than in their observance. 276 Pfizer's conduct comes closer
to reckless behavior than egregious, intentional destruction, as was the case
with the Nazi physicians' experiments.
With an overriding interest in protecting researchers and their
activities, the Declaration fails to address legal consequences for violations
of its guidelines, either in adherence or enforcement. 7 This is not to say
that the Declaration does not have its place, but it is best suited as a policy
guide for individual corporations within the industry, rather than a guide for
entire nations or as an international regulation.
Because the World Medical Association, which is made up of officials
elected or appointed by the healthcare industry, drafts the Declaration,278
the Declaration's principles are strongly influenced by a desire to advance
the medical industry. 279 Even when the ends of the industry appear to be
humanitarian in nature, private entities do not have the inherent
responsibility to humanitarian means that are typical of governmental
organizations. Because the organization as a whole is not political, or
subject to the will of the people, there is no oversight function to ensure
protection of third-party interests.
The Declaration fails to effectively balance protection of the rights of
individuals participating in experimental research and the protection of
physicians and scientific progress. Because of this imbalance, the
Declaration would not serve as an appropriate standard for experimental
research conducted in an international setting. However, the Declaration
would prove effective as a professional standard for physicians conducting
experimental research abroad. Much like the American Medical
Association, WMA and the Declaration provide ethical standards within the
medical profession.
The Guidelines offer a more balanced approach between human rights
and the protection of professionals and other entities engaged in
international experimentation involving humans. Providing explicit
remedies for injury to the patient and liabilities for doctors violating its
276 Sebring, Beals & Crawford, supra note 16, at 299.
277 In fact, the only consequences or attempts at enforcement of the Declaration can be
found in paragraph 27, wherein the WMA advises that any violation of the standards created
in the Declaration should result in the refusal of any entity to publish the results of the
experimental research. See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 39, at para. 27.
278 See WMA Policy, supra note 50.
279 See id.
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standards, 280 the Guidelines seem the most plausible as a ready-made
international guide for corporations and professionals seeking to conduct
experimental research on human subjects abroad. However, much like the
Declaration, the Guidelines lack legal effect, and are only persuasive
arguments for what international standards should be. The UN has yet to
adopt or implement these Guidelines as binding law. 28' By limitation of the
WHO Constitution, the UN has not given the WHO legislative capacity or
binding regulatory power.282  The WHO only has power to suggest its
guidelines to individual countries for implementation. This limitation of
power is an extremely sovereignty-cautious approach toward worldwide
protection of health and is an inefficient means of obtaining the WHO's
objective of ensuring governmental responsibility for maintaining the
overall health of its population.
Universal adoption of any one of the standards as conclusive and
binding on any country, let alone the international community, would not
adequately serve to protect individuals or groups from abusive experimental
research. The three standards cannot continue to co-exist in their current
incarnations because each requires different procedures from researchers
and each prohibits or allows different practices. Researchers attempting to
follow all three simultaneously are left with no clear indication as to what
measures to take when contradictions arise. For individual standards,
researchers are given little direction as to which is the correct standard to
follow, affording patients little protection from misconduct and unethical
experimental procedures. In this respect, the moral underpinnings of
individual autonomy are not safeguarded and are not substantively reflected
in the three standards.
IV. Solutions
An international standard should provide guidelines to national and
local governments regarding minimum standards to conduct, or participate
in, international experimental research. It must also be enforceable,
carrying with it the approval and application of developed and less
developed nations to secure its integrity.
An international standard must also respect national government
sovereignty by setting minimum requirements, allowing additional national
280 See WHO-CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 39, guideline 2 cmt. 19.
281 See Ryan, supra note 266, at 863.
282 See the enumerated powers of the WHO in the Constitution of the World Health
Organization, supra note 75, at art. 2, 62 Stat. at 2681-82, 14 U.N.T.S. at 187-89; see also
What is CIOMS?, supra note 83.
283 Constitution of the World Health Organization, supra note 75, at art. 23, 62 Stat. at
2685, 14 U.N.T.S. at 193.
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governmental regulation and implementation of international standards.
Individuals and companies failing to meet this standard should be held
publicly accountable; violators should be brought before an appropriate
court to preserve fairness and justice. A system for addressing criminal and
civil violations of the international standard must be in place. Countries
and people affected by abuse of the international standard should be given
venue and an opportunity to publicly air their claims and seek legal redress.
An international standard regulating human experimentation should
contain clear guidelines for researchers, governments, and patients to
follow for protection and guidance. Voluntary consent should be expressly
required, requiring specific international minimums for ethical behavior
regarding all aspects of consent, coercion, and capacity. The international
standard should provide for specific measures to be taken to protect patients
and instruct doctors. Specifically, researchers should be required to clarify
and distinguish experimental research from charitable aid. Special
measures should be provided for exigent circumstances where issues of
vulnerability or external coercion arise. Enforcement of the standard
should be clear and binding on the parties.
In order to accomplish effective enforcement, an international agency
should be created to oversee all experimental research throughout the
world, providing an independent investigator to ensure that international28P
standards are observed. Issues affecting the community being studied
should be referred to the community leaders, preferably a national or local
ethical oversight committee for approval. Community leaders, the
independent investigator, and the individuals participating in the research
should approve any departures from minimum standards. The international
enforcement agency should have enforcement powers to bring questions
and claims of abuse or violations before a binding decision maker.
2 5
An international professional licensing agency should be created in
order to promote ethical ideals among the profession. Researchers desiring
to conduct research abroad should be subject to professional regulation.
Included in these licensing standards should be requirements for education
and training in international ethics.286
The international community should create awareness of the need to
287protect against human subjects experimentation, especially among
284 George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, Medical Ethics and Human Rights: Legacies of
Nuremberg, 3 HOFSTRAL.&POL'YSYMP. 111, 118(1999).
285 The international decision making tribunal should be empowered to produce a
common law to guide researchers in interpretation of the international standard.
286 In ethics training, the need to return benefits back to the community could be
propagated.
287 Ankrah & Gostin, supra note 20, at 557.
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developing countries.288 The international community should impress upon
developed nations the need to return benefits to countries from which
scientific information has been reaped.289
V. Conclusion
Universal adoption of any of the current standards would not
adequately serve to protect individuals or groups from abusive experimental
research. Regulation of human experimentation in developing countries is
necessary to produce a single, binding standard to protect against future
abuse. 290  Binding regulation is important to provide for enforcement of
uniform regulation.29  International regulation is necessary to protect
individuals and developing countries by recording acts committed into
history to preserve justice and to serve to protect the basic human right to
freedom of health.
Companies and individuals involved in experimental research in
developing countries need protection if human subject research is to
continue in the future.29 2 If abuse continues to occur, scientific progress
will be hindered by fear of participation from citizens of underdeveloped
countries.29 3 The world cannot afford to disproportionately place a burden
of experimentation on underdeveloped countries if current human rights
294
standards are to remain intact.
288 One approach is to disallow national marketing of products not conforming to
international standards.
289 "The benefits should not just be scientific honors for scholars or profits for vaccine-
producing companies. People in developing countries who have participated in trials must
reap real benefits in terms of the future protection of the population. Scientific, financial, or
administrative imperatives alone seldom provide an overwhelming justification for
research." Ankrah & Gostin, supra note 20, at 555. See Phillips, supra note 15.
290 "Like ghosts from a dark past, the victims of research haunt the dream of biomedical
progress, returning again and again to raise the harsh reality of dignity violated, integrity
invaded, and lives destroyed." Alexander Morgan Capron, Incapacitated Research,
HASTINGS CENTER REP. Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 25.
291 See Osuntokun, supra note 151, at 33.
292 See Phillips, supra note 15.
293 "The Pfizer experience is still haunting our people." Kano Government Addresses
Cholera Outbreak, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Nov. 14, 2001, available at LEXIS,
News Library, BBC Worldwide Monitoring File.
294 Ankrah & Gostin, supra note 20, at 555 ("People and communities cannot be used as
merely a means to an end, regardless of how important the research goal may be.").
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